We develop a dynamic theory of managerial turnover in a world where the quality of the match between a …rm and its managers changes stochastically over time. Shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting but privately observed by the managers.
Introduction
The job security and pay of a …rm's top manager typically rests on the …rm's consistently good performance and future prospects. This makes sense given the substantial impact that top managers are believed to have on …rms' fortunes. At the same time, the environment in which most …rms operate has become increasingly dynamic, implying that managers who are able to deliver high pro…ts in the present may not be able to do so in the future. 1 Shocks to managerial productivity may originate from the opening of new markets, the arrival of new technologies, industry consolidation, or the introduction of new legislation.
The contracts that successful …rms o¤er to their top employees are thus designed not only to incentivize their e¤ort but also to guarantee the desired level of turnover. This is not an easy task given that managers typically have superior information than the board about the determinants of the …rm's pro…ts, the quality of their match with the …rm, and the evolution of their own productivity.
Optimal contracts must therefore provide managers with incentives not only to exert e¤ort but also to report promptly to the board variations in the environment that a¤ect the …rm's prospects under their own control and for leaving the …rm when these prospects deteriorate (equivalently, when the quality of their match with the …rm is not satisfactory anymore).
In this paper, we develop a dynamic theory of managerial contracting which, in addition to the familiar theme of incentivizing e¤ort, accounts explicitly for the following possibilities: (i) managerial ability to generate pro…ts is bound to change (stochastically) over time; (ii) shocks to managerial productivity are anticipated at the time of contracting, but privately observed by the managers; (iii) at each point in time, the board can respond to poor future prospects by replacing an incumbent manager with a new hire; (iv) the …rm's performance under each new hire is going to be a¤ected by the same information frictions as in the relationship with the incumbent.
Accounting for these possibilities not only is realistic, it sheds new light on the joint dynamics (and ine¢ ciency) of e¤ort, retention, and compensation decisions.
Model Preview. In each period, the …rm's cash ‡ows are the result of (i) the incumbent manager's productivity (equivalently, the quality of the match between the …rm and the managerhereafter the manager's "type"), (ii) managerial e¤ort, and (iii) noise. Each manager's productivity is positively correlated over time and each manager has private information about his current and past productivity, as well as about his e¤ort choices. The board only observes the stream of cash ‡ows generated by each manager.
Upon separating from the incumbent, the …rm goes back to the labor market and is randomly matched with a new manager of unknown productivity. Each manager's initial productivity (i.e., his productivity at the time of contracting) is the manager's own private information. Upon joining the …rm, each manager's productivity evolves according to the same stochastic process. This process is meant to capture how the interaction of the environment with the tasks that the manager is asked to perform a¤ects the evolution of the manager's productivity. The environment is perfectly stationary in the sense that the …rm faces the same problem with each manager it hires. As a result, the board o¤ers the same menu of contracts to each manager. 2;3 A contract is described by (i) an e¤ort policy specifying in each period the e¤ort recommended to the manager; (ii) a retention policy specifying in each period whether the manager will be retained in the next period or permanently …red, and (iii) a compensation policy specifying in each period the manager's compensation. The …rst two policy functions can depend upon past and current (self-) reported managerial productivity and past cash ‡ows, while the current period's compensation policy can in addition depend on the current period's cash ‡ow. 4 The positive and normative properties of the joint dynamics of e¤ort, turnover, and performance are identi…ed by characterizing the contract that maximizes the …rm's expected pro…ts (net of managerial compensation) and comparing it to the contract that a benevolent planner would o¤er to each manager to maximize welfare (de…ned to be the sum of the …rm's expected cash ‡ows and of all managers'expected payo¤s-hereafter, the "e¢ cient contract"). Both the pro…t-maximizing and the e¢ cient contracts are obtained by comparing, after each history, the value of continuing the relationship with the incumbent (taking into account the dynamics of future e¤ort and retention decisions) with the expected value from starting a new relationship with a manager of unknown productivity. Importantly, both these values are evaluated from an ex-ante perspective, i.e., at the time each manager is hired. Given the stationarity of the environment, the payo¤ from hiring a new manager must coincide with the payo¤ that the …rm expected from hiring the incumbent. Both the pro…t-maximizing and the e¢ cient contracts are thus obtained through a …xed-point dynamicprogramming problem that internalizes all relevant trade-o¤s and whose solution endogenizes the 2 While our analysis focuses on a representative …rm, both our positive and normative results apply also to certain competitive labor markets where, after dismissal, managers go back to the market and are randomly matched with other identical …rms. 3 What makes a policy of "selling the …rm to the managers" suboptimal is the fact that the managers have private information about their abilities to generate pro…ts for the …rm. This private information, since it originates in idiosyncratic characteristics as well as past working experiences, is present from the very …rst moment a manager is matched with the …rm and has persistent (although typically diminishing) e¤ects over time. Because of such private information, if the …rm were sold to the managers, then any type above the lowest would get the full surplus of his higher productivity. To extract some of this surplus, the board of directors instead retains control of the …rm and introduces distortions in the contracts which govern managers'e¤ort and separation decisions. 4 In general, a turnover policy based solely on observed cash ‡ows cannot induce the optimal sequence of separation decisions. It may be essential that managers keep communicating with the board, e.g., by explaining the determinants of past performances and/or by describing the …rm's prospects under their control. A key role of the optimal contract in our theory is precisely to induce a prompt exchange of information between the managers and the board, in addition to the more familiar role of incentivizing e¤ort through performance-based compensation.
…rm's separation payo¤. 5 Key positive results. Our key positive prediction is that the …rm's optimal retention decisions become more permissive with time: the productivity level that the …rm requires for each manager to be retained declines with the number of periods that the manager has been working for the …rm.
This result originates from the combination of the following two assumptions: (i) the e¤ect of a manager's initial productivity on his future productivities declines over time; 6 and (ii) variations in managerial productivity are anticipated, but privately observed.
The explanation rests on the board's desire to pay the most productive managers just enough to separate them from the less productive ones. Similar to La¤ont and Tirole (1986) , the resulting "rent"
originates from the possibility for the most productive managers of generating the same distribution of present and future cash ‡ows as the less productive ones by working less, thus economizing on the disutility of e¤ort. Contrary to La¤ont and Tirole's static analysis, in our dynamic environment …rms have two instruments to limit such rents: …rst, they can induce less productive managers to work less (e.g., by o¤ering them contracts with low-powered incentives where compensation is relatively insensitive to realized cash ‡ows); in addition, they can commit to a replacement policy that is more severe to a manager whose initial productivity is low in terms of the future productivity and performance levels required for retention. Both instruments play the role of discouraging those managers who are most productive at the contracting stage from mimicking the less productive ones and are thus most e¤ective when targeted at those managers whose initial productivity is low.
The key observation is that, when the e¤ect of a manager's initial productivity on his subsequent productivity declines over time, the e¤ectiveness of such instruments is higher when they are used at the early stages of the relationship than in the distant future. The reason is that, from the perspective of a manager who is initially most productive, his ability to "do better"than a manager who is initially less productive is prominent at the early stages, but expected to decline over time due to the imperfect serial dependence of the productivity process.
The …rm's pro…t-maximizing retention policy is then obtained by trading o¤ two considerations.
On the one hand, the desire to respond promptly and e¢ ciently to variations in the environment that a¤ect the …rm's prospects under the incumbent's control, of course taking into account the dynamics of future e¤ort and retention decisions. This concern calls for retaining managers whose productivity is expected to remain or turn high irrespective of whether or not their initial productivity was low.
On the other hand, the value of o¤ering a contract that reduces the compensation that the …rm must pay to the managers who are most productive at the hiring stage. This second concern calls for committing to a retention policy that is most severe to those managers whose initial productivity is 5 Note that endogenizing the payo¤ the …rm expects after separating from each incumbent manager is essential to the normative results in the paper. 6 Below, we provide a formal statement of this assumption in terms of a statistical property of the process governing the evolution of managerial productivity.
low. However, because the value of such commitments declines with the length of the employment relationship, the pro…t-maximizing retention policy becomes gradually more lenient over time.
Our theory thus o¤ers a possible explanation for what in the eyes of an external observer may look like "entrenchment". That managers with a longer tenure are retained under the same conditions that would have called for separation at a shorter tenure is, in our theory, the result of a fully optimal contract, as opposed to the result of a lack of commitment or of good governance. In this respect, our explanation is fundamentally di¤erent from the alternative view that managers with longer tenure are "entrenched" because they are able to exert more in ‡uence over the board, either because of manager-speci…c investments, as in Shleifer and Vishny (1989) or excessive …ring at the early stages of the relationship, followed by excessive retention in the long run. By excessive retention we mean the following. Any manager who is …red after t periods of employment under the pro…t-maximizing contract is either …red in the same period or earlier under the e¢ cient policy. By excessive …ring we mean the exact opposite: any manager …red at the end of period t under the e¢ cient policy is either …red at the end of the same period or earlier under the pro…t-maximizing contract.
The result that retention decisions become less e¢ cient over time may appear in contrast to …ndings in the dynamic mechanism design literature that "distortions" in optimal contracts typically decrease over time and vanish in the long-run. (This property has been documented by various authors, going back at least to Besanko's (1985) seminal work; see Battaglini (2005) for a recent contribution, and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012) for a unifying explanation based on the statistical property of declining impulse responses).
The reason why we do not …nd convergence to e¢ ciency in the setting of this paper is that the …rm's endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the payo¤ that the …rm expects from going back to the labor market and o¤ering the pro…t-maximizing contract to each new manager) is lower than the planner's endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the surplus that the planner expects by forcing the …rm to go back to the labor market and o¤er the welfare-maximizing contract to each new manager).
Indeed, the fact that each manager has private information about his own productivity at the time of contracting means that the …rm cannot extract the full surplus from the relationship with each manager while inducing him to work e¢ ciently. As explained above, the …rm expects, at the time of hiring, to extract more surplus from the relationship with each incumbent as time goes by, with the ‡ow payo¤ of the …rm eventually converging to the ‡ow total surplus that a benevolent planner would expect by retaining the same incumbent. The fact that the …rm expects a lower payo¤ than the planner from going back to the labor market then implies that, eventually, the …rm becomes excessively lenient in retaining its incumbents, relative to what is e¢ cient. 7 This last result suggests that policy interventions aimed at inducing …rms to sustain a higher turnover, e.g., by o¤ering them temporary tax incentives after a change in management, or through the introduction of a mandatory retirement age for top employees, can, in principle, increase welfare. 8 Of course, such policies might be expected to encounter opposition on other grounds whose discussion is beyond the scope of this analysis.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section we brie ‡y review the pertinent literature. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes the e¢ cient contract. Section 4 characterizes the …rm's pro…t-maximizing contract and uses it to establish the key positive results. Section 5 compares the dynamics of retention decisions under the e¢ cient contract with those under the pro…t-maximizing contract and establishes the key normative results. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related literature
The paper is related to various lines of research in the managerial compensation and turnover lit- The reason why the threat of termination is essential in these papers is that the agent is protected by limited liability. This implies that incentives provided entirely through performancebased compensation need not be strong enough. The threat of termination is also crucial in the "e¢ ciency wages" theory; in particular, see Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1984) seminal work. However, contrary to the literature cited above, in the e¢ ciency-wages theory, under the optimal contract, no worker shirks and hence replacement does not occur in equilibrium.
Related to this line of research is also the work by Spear and Wang (2005) , Wang (2008) and Sannikov (2008) . These papers show how a risk-averse agent may be optimally induced to cease to exert e¤ort and then retire, once his promised continuation utility becomes either too high or too low, making it too costly for the …rm to incentivize further e¤ort. 10 7 Note that this result also applies to a setting in which optimal e¤ort is constant over time. 8 See Lazear (1979) for alternative explanations for why mandatory retirement can be bene…cial. 9 Despite the vast attention that this property has received in the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence of the e¤ect of turnover on incentives is mixed. See Jenter and Lewellen (2010) for a recent discussion and Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2008) for a recent empirical study of the relationship between promotion, turnover, and compensation in the market for executives. 1 0 Another paper where dismissal helps creating incentives is Sen (1996) . In this paper, the manager's private
While not all the works cited above focus explicitly on turnover, they do o¤er implications for the dynamics of retention decisions. For example, Wang (2008) shows how a worker with a shorter tenure faces a higher probability of an involuntary layo¤ and a lower probability of voluntary retirement than a worker with a longer tenure. In a …nancial contracting setting, Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) show how, on average, a borrower's promised continuation utility increases over time and how this requires an increase in the likelihood that the loan is rolled over. Similarly, Fong and Li (2010) …nd that the turnover rate eventually decreases in the duration of the employment relationship, but, because contracts are relational, they also …nd that the turnover rate may initially increase. In the same spirit, Board (2011) …nds that …rms'retention decisions become ine¢ ciently lenient after long tenure when they are governed by a relational contract. 11 The above literature does not account for the possibility of changes in managerial productivity (equivalently, in the quality of the match between the manager and the …rm). It therefore misses the possibility that turnover is driven by variations in managerial productivity in addition to concerns for incentivizing e¤ort. Such a possibility has long been recognized as important by another body of the literature that dates back at least to Jovanovic (1979) . 12 This paper considers an environment where productivity (equivalently, the match quality) is constant over time but unknown to both the …rm and the worker who jointly learn it over time through the observation of realized output.
Because of learning, turnover becomes less likely over time. 13 Our theory di¤ers from Jovanovic (1979) in a few respects. First, and importantly, we allow learning about match quality to be asymmetric between the workers and the …rm, with the former possessing superior information than the latter. Second, we explicitly model managerial e¤ort and account for the fact that it must be incentivized. Third, we consider more general processes for the evolution of the match quality.
These distinctions lead to important di¤erences in the results. First, while in Jovanovic's model the leniency of turnover decisions originates from the accumulation of information over time, in our model turnover decisions become more lenient over time even when conditioning on the accuracy of available information (formally, even when the kernels, i.e., the transition probabilities, remain constant over time). Second, while in Jovanovic's model turnover decisions are always second-best information is the productivity of the …rm, which is assumed to be constant over time and independent of the manager who runs it. As in the current paper, commitments to replace the initial manager help reducing informational rents.
However, contrary to the current paper, there are no hidden actions and there is a single replacement decision. The analysis in Sen (1996) thus does not permit one to study how the leniency of retention decisions evolves over time. 1 1 A key di¤erence between the result in Board (2011) and the one in the present paper is that, while ine¢ ciency in his model originates in the …rm's inability to committ to long-term contracts, which can be viewed as a form of "lack of good governance," in our model is entirely due to asymmetric information. 1 2 Allgood and Farrell (2003) provide empirical support for the importance of variations in managerial productivity and, more generally, in match quality for turnover decisions. 1 3 Related is also Holmstrom's (1999) career concerns model. While this paper does not characterize the optimal turnover policy, the evolution of career concerns has been recognized as a possible determinant for turnover; see, for example, Mukherjee (2008) .
e¢ cient, in our model, turnover decisions are second-best ine¢ cient and the ine¢ ciency of such decisions typically increases over time. 14 More recent papers where turnover is also driven by variations in match quality include Acharya with job stability. Because a longer tenure implies a higher probability of having delivered a high performance in the past, their model also o¤ers a possible explanation for why retention decisions may become more lenient over time.
An important distinction between our paper and the two bodies of the literature discussed above is that, in our theory, variations in match quality are anticipated but privately observed. As a result, a properly designed contract must not only incentivize e¤ort but also provide managers with incentives for truthfully reporting to the board variations in match quality that call for adjustments in the the managers'private information may change over time and hence an analysis of how the leniency of optimal turnover decisions evolves with the managers'tenure in the …rm. 16 1 4 Ine¢ ciencies originate in our theory from the combination of asymmetric information at the contracting stage with search frictions. Because neither the …rms nor the managers can appropriate the entire surplus, contractual decisions are distorted relative to their second-best counterparts. 1 5 Acharya (1992) also documents the possible optimality of permanently tenuring a CEO, a possibility that we also accomodate but which we show to never be optimal in our model. 1 6 An exception is Gayle, Golan and Miller (2008) . They use a longitudinal data set to evaluate the importance of moral hazard and job experience in jointly determining promotion, turnover rates, and compensation, and to study how the latter changes across the di¤erent layers of an organization. The focus of their analysis is, however, very di¤erent from ours.
Another important di¤erence between our work and each of the various papers mentioned above is that it o¤ers an analysis of how the ine¢ ciency of turnover decisions evolves over time. To the best of our knowledge, this analysis has no precedents in the literature. As explained above, this is made possible by endogenizing the …rm's separation payo¤ and recognizing that the relationship with each new hire is going to be a¤ected by the same frictions as the one with each incumbent. Recognizing this possibility is essential to our normative result about the excessive leniency of retention decisions after a long tenure.
From a methodological viewpoint, the paper builds on recent developments in the theory of dynamic mechanism design with persistent shocks to the agents'private information 17 and in particular on Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012). 18 Among other things, that paper (i) establishes an envelope theorem for dynamic stochastic problems which is instrumental to the design of optimal dynamic mechanisms and (ii) shows how the dynamics of distortions is driven by the dynamics of the impulse responses of the future types to the initial ones. The current paper applies these insights and, more generally, the methodology of Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012), to a managerial contracting environment. It also shows how the techniques in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012) must be adapted to accommodate moral hazard in a non-time-separable dynamic mechanism design setting. The core (and distinctive) contribution of the present paper is, however, in the predictions that the theory identi…es for the joint dynamics of e¤ort, retention, and compensation.
Related is also Garrett and Pavan (2011b) . That work shares with the present paper the same managerial contracting framework. However, it completely abstracts from the possibility of replacement, which is the focus of the present paper. Instead, it investigates how the optimality of seniority-based schemes (that is, schemes that provide managers with longer tenure with more high-powered incentives) is a¤ected by the managers' degree of risk aversion. 19 In particular, that paper shows that, under risk neutrality and declining impulse responses, optimal e¤ort increases, on average, with time. The same property holds in the present paper, but is not essential for the 1 7 The literature on dynamic mechanism design goes back to the pioneering work of Baron and Besanko (1984) and Besanko (1985) . In contrast, both the optimal and the e¢ cient contracts in our paper are obtained through a …xed-point dynamic programming problem whose solution is not recursive, thus permitting us to show how e¤ort, compensation, and retention decisions depend explicitly on the entire history of productivity shocks. 1 9 While, for simplicity, the current paper does not account for the possibility that the managers are risk averse, we expect our key predictions to remain true for a low degree of risk aversion.
dynamics of retention decisions. In fact, while we …nd it instructive to relate these dynamics to the ones for e¤ort, neither our positive nor our normative results hinge on the property that e¤ort, on average, increases with tenure: the same results hold if the …rm is constrained to ask the same level of e¤ort from the manager in all periods. 20 Obviously related is also the entire literature on dynamic managerial compensation without replacement. This literature is too vast to be successfully summarized here. We refer the reader to Edmans and Gabaix (2009) for an overview. See also Edmans and Gabaix (2011), and Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) for recent contributions where, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1986) and in the current paper, the moral hazard problem is solved using techniques from the mechanism design literature. These works consider a setting where (i) there is no turnover, (ii) managers possess no private information at the time of contracting, and (iii) it is optimal to induce a constant level of e¤ort over time. Relaxing (i) and (ii) is essential to our results. As explained above, endogenizing e¤ort is also important for our predictions about the joint dynamics of e¤ort, retention, and compensation, but is not essential to the key properties identi…ed in this paper.
Model
Players. A principal (the board of directors, acting on behalf of the shareholders of the …rm) is in charge of designing a new employment contract to govern the …rm's interaction with its managers. 21 The …rm is expected to operate for in…nitely many periods and each manager is expected to live as long as the …rm. There are in…nitely many managers. All managers are ex-ante identical, meaning that they have the same preferences and that their productivity (to be interpreted as their ability to generate cash ‡ows for the …rm) is drawn independently from the same distribution and is expected to evolve over time according to the same Markov process described below.
Stochastic process. The process governing the evolution of each manager's productivity is assumed to be independent of calendar time and exogenous to the …rm's decisions. This process has two components: the distribution from which each manager's initial productivity is drawn, and the 2 0 For example, dynamics of retention decisions qualitatively similar to the ones in this paper arise in an environment where e¤ort can take only negative values, say e 2 [ K; 0]; and where e = 0 is interpreted as "no stealing" and is optimally sustained at all periods, as in DeMarzo and Fishman (2007). 2 1 As anticipated above, the focus of the analysis is on the contracts o¤ered by a representative …rm for given contracts o¤ered by all other competing …rms (equivalently, for given managers'outside options). However, the pro…t-maximizing and e¢ cient contracts characterized below are also equilibrium and welfare-maximizing contracts in a setting where unemployed managers are randomly matched with many (ex-ante identical) …rms. Indeed, as it will become clear, as long as the number of potential managers is large compared to the number of competing …rms, so that the matching probabilities remain independent of the contracts selected, then the managers'outside options (i.e., their payo¤ after separation occurs) have an e¤ect on the level of compensation but not on the pro…t-maximizing and e¢ cient e¤ort and retention policies.
family of conditional distributions describing how productivity evolves upon joining the …rm.
For each t 1, let t denote a manager's productivity in the t-th period of employment. Each manager's productivity during the …rst period of employment coincides with his productivity prior to joining the …rm. This productivity is drawn from the absolutely continuous distribution F 1 with support = ( ; ) R and density function f 1 : The distribution F 1 is meant to capture the distribution of managerial talent in the population.
For all t > 1, t is drawn from the cumulative distribution function F ( j t 1 ) with support . 22 We assume that the function F is continuously di¤erentiable over 2 and denote by f ( t j t 1 ) @F ( t j t 1 )=@ t the density of the cumulative distribution F ( j t 1 ). We assume that, for any
This guarantees (i) that the conditional distributions can be ranked according to …rst-order stochastic dominance, and (ii) that the impulse responses (which are de…ned below and which capture the process's degree of persistence) are uniformly bounded. 23 Given F 1 and the family F hF ( j )i 2 of conditional distributions, we then de…ne the impulse responses of future productivity to earlier productivity as follows (the de…nition here parallels that in Pavan, Segal and Toikka, 2012). Let" be a random variable uniformly distributed over E = [0; 1]
and note that, for any 2 ; the random variable z ( ;")
by the Integral Transform Probability Theorem. For any 2 N, then let Z : E ! be the function de…ned inductively as follows:
" 2 ) and so forth. 24 For any s and t; s < t; and any continuation history t s ( s ; :::; t ); the impulse response of t to s is then de…ned by
where " t s ( t s ) denotes the unique sequence of shocks that, starting from s , leads to the continua- 2 2 The process is thus time autonomous: the kernels are independent of the length of the employment relationship so that Ft ( j ) = F ( j ) all t > 1. Each kernel has support on the same interval that de…nes the support of the period-1 distribution F1. Both of these assumptions, as well as many of the technical conditions below, are stronger than needed for our results, but simplify the exposition. See the working paper version of the manuscript, Garrett and Pavan (2011a), for how to accomodate non time-autonomous processes with shifting supports and Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012) for how to relax some of the technical conditions. On the other hand, allowing for more than two periods is essential to our results about the dynamics of retention decisions. Allowing for more than two productivity levels is also essential. In fact, one can easily verify that, with two productivity levels, the optimal retention policy takes one of the following three forms: (i) either the manager is never replaced, irrespective of the evolution of his productivity;
or (ii) he is retained if and only if his initial productivity was high; or (iii) he is …red as soon as his productivity turns low. In each case, the retention policy (i.e., whether the manager is retained as a function of his period-t productivity)
is independent of the length of the employment relationship. 2 3 The lower bound on @F ( tj t 1)=@ t 1 is equivalent to assuming that, for any t 1 2 , any x 2 R,
That is, the probability that a manager's productivity in period t exceeds the one in the previous period by more than x is nonincreasing in the previous period's productivity. 2 4 Throughout the entire manuscript, we will use superscripts to denote sequences of variables. tion history t s : These impulse response functions are the nonlinear analogs of the familiar constant linear impulse responses for autoregressive processes. For example, in the case of an AR(1) process with persistence parameter , the impulse response of t to s is simply given by the scalar J t s = t s : More generally, the impulse response J t s t s captures the e¤ect of an in…nitesimal variation of s on t , holding constant the shocks " t s ( t s ). As shown below, these functions play a key role in determining the dynamics of pro…t-maximizing e¤ort and turnover policies.
Throughout, we will maintain the assumption that types evolve independently across managers.
E¤ort, cash ‡ows, and payo¤s. After learning his period-t productivity t , the manager currently employed by the …rm must choose an e¤ort level e t 2 E = R: 25 The …rm's per-period cash ‡ows, gross of the manager's compensation, are given by
where t is transitory noise. The shocks t are i.i.d. over time, independent across managers, and drawn from the distribution , with expectation E[~ t ] = 0. The sequences of productivities t and e¤ort choices e t (e 1 ; :::; e t ) 2 E t are the manager's private information. In contrast, the history of cash ‡ows t ( 1 ; :::; t ) 2 R t generated by each manager is veri…able and can be used as a basis for compensation.
By choosing e¤ort e 2 E in period t, the manager su¤ers a disutility (e) 0 where ( ) is a di¤erentiable and Lipschitz continuous function with (0) = 0. As in La¤ont and Tirole (1986), we assume that there exists a scalar e > 0 such that is thrice continuously di¤erentiable over (0; e) with 0 (e); 00 (e) > 0 and 000 (e) 0 for all e 2 (0; e), and that 0 (e) > 1 for all e > e. 26 These last properties guarantee that both the e¢ cient and the pro…t-maximizing e¤ort levels are interior, while ensuring that the manager's payo¤ is equi-Lipschitz continuous in e¤ort. The latter property permits us to conveniently express the value function through a di¤erentiable envelope formula (more below). 27 Denoting by c t the compensation that the manager receives in period t (equivalently, his periodt consumption), the manager's preferences over (lotteries over) streams of consumption levels c (c 1 ; c 2 ; : : : ) and streams of e¤ort choices e (e 1 ; e 2 ; :::) are described by an expected utility function with (Bernoulli) utility given by
where < 1 is the (common) discount factor. 2 5 The assumption that e¤ort takes on any real value is only for simplicity. 2 6 Note that these conditions are satis…ed, for example, when e > 1, (e) = (1=2)e 2 for all e 2 (0; e), and (e) = ee e 2 =2 for all e > e: 2 7 None of the results hinge on the value of e. Indeed, the …rm's payo¤ is invariant to e (holding constant over the interval fe : 0 0 (e) 1g).
The principal's objective is to maximize the discounted sum of the …rm's expected pro…ts, de…ned to be cash ‡ows net of managerial compensation. Formally, let it and c it denote, respectively, the cash ‡ow generated and the compensation received by the i th manager employed by the …rm in his t th period of employment. Then, let T i denote the number of periods for which manager i works for the …rm. The contribution of manager i to the …rm's payo¤, evaluated at the time manager i is hired, is given by
Next, denote by I 2 N[ f+1g the total number of managers hired by the …rm over its in…nite life.
The …rm's payo¤, given the cash ‡ows and payments (
, is then given by
Given the stationarity of the environment, with an abuse of notation, throughout the entire analysis, we will omit all indices i referring to the identities of the managers.
Timing and labor market. The …rm's interaction with the labor market unfolds as follows.
Each manager learns his initial productivity 1 prior to being matched with the …rm. After being matched, the manager is o¤ered a menu of contracts described in detail below. While the …rm can perfectly commit to the contracts it o¤ers, each manager is free to leave the …rm at each point in time. After leaving the …rm, the manager receives a continuation payo¤ equal to U o 0. 28 We assume that (i) it is never optimal for the …rm to operate without a manager being in control, (ii) that it is too costly to sample another manager before separating from the incumbent, and (iii) that all replacement decisions must be planned at least one period in advance. These assumptions capture (in a reduced form) various frictions in the recruiting process that prevent …rms from sampling until they …nd a manager of the highest possible productivity, which is unrealistic and would make the analysis uninteresting. 29 2 8 That the outside option is invariant to the manager's productivity is a simpli…cation. All our results extend qualitatively to a setting where the outside option is type dependent as long as the derivative of the outside option U o ( t) with respect to current productivity is su¢ ciently small that the single-crossing conditions of Section 4 are preserved. This is the case, for example, when (i) the discount factor is not very high, and/or (ii) it takes a long time for a manager to …nd a new job. Also note that, from the perspective of the …rm under examination, this outside option is exogenous. However, in a richer setting with multiple identical …rms and exogenous matching probabilities, U o will coincide with the equilibrium continuation payo¤ that each manager expects from going back to the labor market and being randomly matched (possibly after an unemployment phase) with another …rm. In such an environment, each manager's outside option is both time-and type-invariant (and equal to zero) if there are in…nitely more managers than …rms. 2 9 The assumption of random matching is also quite standard in the labor/matching literature (see, e.g., Jovanovic, 1979 ). In our setting, it implies that there is no direct competition among managers for employment contracts. This distinguishes our environment from an auction-like setting where, in each period, the principal consults simultaneously with multiple managers and then chooses which one to hire/retain.
After signing one of the contracts, the manager privately chooses e¤ort e 1 . Nature then draws 1 from the distribution and the …rm's (gross) cash ‡ows 1 are determined according to (1) .
After observing the cash ‡ows 1 , the …rm pays the manager a compensation c 1 which may depend on the speci…c contract selected by the manager and on the veri…able cash ‡ow 1 . Based on the speci…c contract selected at the time of contracting and on the observed cash ‡ow, the manager is then either retained or dismissed at the end of the period. 30 If the manager is retained, his secondperiod productivity is then drawn from the distribution F ( j 1 ). After privately learning 2 , at the beginning of the second period of employment, the manager then decides whether or not to leave the …rm. If he leaves, he obtains the continuation payo¤ U o . If he stays, he is then o¤ered the possibility of modifying the terms of the contract that pertain to future compensation and retention decisions within limits speci…ed by the contract signed in the …rst period (as it will become clear in a moment, these adjustments are formally equivalent to reporting the new productivity 2 ). After these adjustments are made, the manager privately chooses e¤ort e 2 , cash ‡ows 2 are realized, and the manager is then paid a compensation c 2 as speci…ed by the original contract along with the adjustments made at the beginning of the second period (clearly, the compensation c 2 may also depend on the entire history of observed cash ‡ows 2 = ( 1 ; 2 )). Given the contract initially signed, the adjustments made in period two, and the observed cash ‡ows 2 ; the manager is then either retained into the next period or dismissed at the end of the period.
The entire sequence of events described above repeats itself over time until the …rm separates from the manager or the latter unilaterally decides to leave the …rm. After separation occurs, at the beginning of the subsequent period, the …rm goes back to the labor market and is randomly matched with a new manager whose initial productivity 1 is drawn from the same stationary distribution F 1 from which the incumbent's initial productivity was drawn. The relationship between any newly sampled manager and the …rm then unfolds in the same way as described above for the incumbent.
The employment relationship as a dynamic mechanism
Because all managers are ex-ante identical, time is in…nite, and types evolve independently across managers, the …rm o¤ers the same menu of contracts to each manager it is matched with. Under any such contract, the compensation that the …rm pays to the manager (as well as the retention decisions) may depend on the cash ‡ows produced by the manager as well as on messages sent by the manager over time (as explained above, the role of these messages is to permit the …rm to respond to 3 0 That retention decisions are speci…ed explicitly in the contract simpli…es the exposition but is not essential. For example, by committing to pay a su¢ ciently low compensation after all histories that are supposed to lead to separation, the …rm can always implement the desired retention policy by delegating to the managers the choice of whether or not to stay in the relationship. It will become clear from the analysis below that, while both the optimal and the e¢ cient retention policies are unique, there are many ways these policies can be implemented (see, e.g., Yermack, 2006 for a description of the most popular termination clauses and "golden handshakes" practices).
variations in productivity). However, both compensation and retention decisions are independent of both the calendar time at which the manager was hired and of the history of messages sent and cash ‡ows generated by other managers. Hereafter, we will thus maintain the notation that t denotes the number of periods that a representative manager has been working for the …rm and not the calendar time.
Furthermore, because the …rm can commit, one can conveniently describe the …rm's contract as a direct revelation mechanism. This speci…es, for each period t, a recommended e¤ort choice, the contingent compensation, and a retention decision.
In principle, both the level of e¤ort recommended and the retention decision may depend on the history of reported productivities and on the history of cash ‡ow realizations. However, it can be shown that, under both the e¢ cient and the pro…t-maximizing contracts, the optimal e¤ort and retention decisions depend only on reported productivities t : 31 This is because any type of manager, by adjusting his e¤ort level, can generate the same cash ‡ow distribution as any other type, regardless of the other type's e¤ort level and regardless of the noise distribution (in particular, even if the noise is absent). Cash ‡ows are thus a very weak signal of productivity-which is the only serially correlated state variable-and hence play no prominent role in retention and future e¤ort decisions, which are decisions about productivity. 32 On the other hand, because the e¤ort decisions are "hidden actions"
(i.e., because of moral hazard), it is essential that the total compensation be allowed to depend both on the reported productivities t as well as on past and current cash ‡ows t .
Hereafter, we will thus model the employment relationship induced by the pro…t-maximizing and the e¢ cient contracts as a direct revelation mechanism h ; x; i. This consists of a sequences of 34 Given any sequence 1 , we then denote by ( 1 ) min t : t t = 0 the corresponding length of the employment relationship.
In each period t, given the previous reports^ t 1 and cash ‡ow realizations t 1 , the employment relationship unfolds as follows:
After learning his period-t productivity t 2 t , and upon deciding to stay in the relationship, the manager sends a report^ t 2 t ;
The mechanism then prescribes e¤ort t (^ t 1 ;^ t ) and speci…es a reward scheme x t (^ t 1 ;^ t ; t 1 ; ) :
R ! R along with a retention decision t (^ t 1 ;^ t );
The manager then chooses e¤ort e t ;
After observing the realized cash ‡ows t = e t + t + t , the manager is paid
and is then either retained or replaced according to the decision t (^ t 1 ;^ t ):
By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms for which (i) a truthful and obedient strategy is optimal for the manager, and (ii) after any truthful and obedient history, the manager …nds it optimal to stay in the relationship whenever o¤ered the possibility of doing so (i.e., the manager never …nds it optimal to leave the …rm when he has the option to stay). In the language of dynamic mechanism design, the …rst property means that the mechanism is "incentive compatible" while the second property means that it is "sequentially individually rational ".
Remark: While we are not imposing limited liability (or cash) constraints on the principal's problem, the e¤ort and retention policies that we characterize below turn out to be implementable with non-negative payments for reasonable parameter speci…cations (see Corollary 1 below).
The e¢ cient contract
We begin by describing the e¤ort and turnover policies E and E that maximize ex-ante welfare, de…ned to be the sum of a representative manager's expected payo¤ and of the …rm's expected pro…ts (the "e¢ cient" policies). Although we are clearly interested in characterizing these policies for the same environment as described above, it turns out that these policies coincide with the ones that maximize ex-ante welfare in an environment with symmetric information, in which the managers' productivities and e¤ort choices are observable and veri…able. In turn, because all players'payo¤s are linear in payments, these policies also coincide with the ones that the …rm would choose under symmetric information to maximize expected pro…ts. For simplicity, in this section, we thus assume information is symmetric and then show in Section 5 -Proposition 7 -that the e¢ cient policies under symmetric information remain implementable also under asymmetric information.
The e¢ cient e¤ort policy is very simple: Because all players are risk neutral and because each manager's productivity has no e¤ect on the marginal cost or the marginal bene…t of e¤ort, the e¢ cient e¤ort level e E is independent of the history of realized productivities and implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order condition 0 (e E ) = 1.
The e¢ cient turnover policy, on the other hand, is the solution to a dynamic programming problem. Because the …rm does not know the future productivity of its current manager, nor the productivities of its future hires, this problem involves a trade-o¤ in each period between experimenting with a new manager and continuing experimenting with the incumbent. Denote by B E the set of all bounded functions from to R. The solution to the aforementioned trade-o¤ can be represented as a value function W E 2 B E that, for any 2 , and irrespective of t, gives the …rm's expected continuation payo¤ when the incumbent manager's productivity is . 35 Clearly, the value W E ( ) takes into account the possibility of replacing the manager in the future. As we show in the Appendix, the function W E is the unique …xed point to the mapping T E : B E ! B E de…ned, for all
The e¢ cient contract can then be described as follows.
Proposition 1
The e¢ cient e¤ ort and turnover policies satisfy the following properties. 37 (i) For all t; all t 2 t , E t ( t ) = e E ; with e E implicitly de…ned by 0 (e E ) = 1.
(ii) Conditional on being employed in period t; the manager is retained at the end of period t if and only if t E ;where
The proof uses the Contraction Mapping Theorem to establish existence and uniqueness of a function W E that is a …xed point to the mapping T E : B E ! B E de…ned above. It then shows that this function is indeed the value function for the problem described above. Finally, it establishes that the function W E is nondecreasing. These properties, together with the assumptions that the process is Markov, autonomous, and with kernels that can be ranked according to …rst-order stochastic dominance, imply that turnover decisions must be taken according to the cut-o¤ rule given in the proposition. 3 5 Note that if the process were not autonomous, the e¢ cient retention decision would obviously depend also on the length t of the employment relationship. See the working paper version of the manuscript Garrett and Pavan (2011a) for how the result in the next proposition must be adapted to accomodate non-autonomous processes. 3 6 The expectations E~ j [W (~ )] and E~
1
[W (~ 1)] are, respectively, under the measures F ( j ) and F1( ) -recall that, under the simplifying assumption that the process is autonomous, for any t > 1; any 2 ; Ft( j ) = F ( j ): 3 7 The e¢ cient policies are "essentially unique", i.e., unique up to a zero-measure set of histories.
The pro…t-maximizing contract
We now turn to the contract that maximizes the …rm's expected pro…ts in a setting where neither the managers'productivities nor their e¤ort choices are observable. As anticipated above, what prevents the …rm from appropriating the entire surplus (equivalently, from "selling out" the project to the managers) is the fact that, both at the initial contracting stage, as well as at any subsequent period, each manager is privately informed about his productivity. To extract some of the surplus from the most productive types, the …rm must then introduce distortions in e¤ort and retention decisions, which require retaining ownership of the project.
We start by showing that, in any incentive-compatible mechanism h ; x; i, each type's intertemporal expected payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy V ( 1 ) must satisfy
The derivation of this formula follows from arguments similar to those in Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2012), adapted to the environment under examination here. To establish (4), consider the following …ctitious environment where the manager can misrepresent his type but is then "forced"to choose e¤ort so as to hide his lies by inducing the same distribution of cash ‡ows as if his reported type coincided with the true one. This is to say that, at any period t, given the history of reports^ t and the true current productivity t , the manager must choose e¤ort
so that the distribution of the period-t cash ‡ows is the same as when the manager's true period-t productivity is^ t and the manager follows the recommended e¤ort choice t (^ t ):
Clearly, if the mechanism is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational in the original environment where the manager is free to choose his e¤ort after misreporting his type, it must also be in this …ctitious one, where he is forced to choose e¤ort according to (5) . This allows us to focus on a necessary condition for the optimality of truthful reporting by the manager in the …ctitious environment which remains necessary for such behavior in the original one.
Fix an arbitrary sequence of reports^ 1 and an arbitrary sequence of true productivities 1 . Let C(^ 1 ) denote the present value of the stream of payments that the manager expects to receive from the principal when the sequence of reported productivities is^ 1 and, in each period, he chooses e¤ort according to (5) . 38 For any ( 1 ;^ 1 ), the manager's expected payo¤ in this …ctitious environment is 3 8 Note that, by construction, C does not depend on the true productivities 1 : Also note that the expectation here is over the transitory noise v 1 :
given by
The assumption that is di¤erentiable and Lipschitz continuous implies that U is totally di¤eren-tiable in t , any t, and equi-Lipschitz continuous in 1 in the norm
Together with the fact that jj 1 jj is …nite (which is implied by the assumption that is bounded)
and that the impulse responses J t s ( t ) are uniformly bounded, this means that the dynamic envelope theorem of Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2012) (Proposition 3) applies to this environment. Hence, a necessary condition for truthful reporting to be optimal for the manager in this …ctitious environment (and by implication also in the original one) is that the value function V ( 1 ) associated to the problem that involves choosing the reports and then selecting e¤ort according to (5) is Lipschitz continuous and, at each point of di¤erentiability, satis…es
where @U( 1 ; 1 )=@ t denotes the partial derivative of U( 1 ; 1 ) with respect to the true (rather than the reported) type t . The result then follows from the fact that
and the de…nition of the stopping time ( 1 ) min t : t t = 0 :
The formula in (4) con…rms the intuition that the expected surplus that the principal must leave to each period-1 type is determined by the dynamics of e¤ ort and retention decisions under the contracts o¤ered to the less productive types. As anticipated in the Introduction, this is because those managers who are most productive at the contracting stage expect to be able to obtain a "rent" when mimicking the less productive types. This rent originates from the possibility of generating the same cash ‡ows as the less productive types by working less, thus economizing on the disutility of e¤ort. The amount of e¤ort they expect to save must, however, take into account the fact that their own productivity, as well as that of the types they are mimicking, will change over time. This is done by weighting the amount of e¤ort saved in all subsequent periods by the impulse response functions J t 1 , which, as explained above, control for how the e¤ect of the initial productivity on future productivity evolves over time. Now let
denote the inverse hazard rate of the …rst-period distribution. Then (4) gives the following useful result (the proof follows from the arguments above).
Proposition 2 In any incentive-compatible and sequentially individually rational mechanism
h ; x; i, the …rm's expected pro…ts from each manager it hires are given by
where V ( ) U o denotes the expected payo¤ of the lowest period-1 type.
The formula in (6) is the dynamic analog of the familiar virtual surplus formula for static adverse selection settings. It expresses the …rm's expected pro…ts as the discounted expected total surplus generated by the relationship, net of terms that control for the surplus that the …rm must leave to the manager to induce him to participate in the mechanism and to truthfully reveal his private information.
Equipped with the aforementioned representation, we now consider a "relaxed program" that involves choosing the policies ( t ( ); t ( )) 1 t=1 so as to maximize the expected total payo¤ of the …rm, taking the contribution of each manager to be (6) (note that this incorporates only the local incentive constraints) and subject to the participation constraints of the lowest period-1 types V ( ) U o .
Below, we …rst characterize the policies ( t ( ); t ( )) 1 t=1 that solve the relaxed program. We then provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a compensation scheme x such that the mechanism h ; x ; i is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational (and hence pro…t maximizing for the …rm).
t and denote by B the set of bounded functions from A to R: For any e¤ort policy , let W denote the unique …xed point to the mapping T ( ) : B ! B de…ned, for all W 2 B, all t; all t , by
(1 )
Proposition 3
Let be the e¤ ort policy implicitly de…ned, for all t; all t 2 t , by 39
and (suppressing the dependence on to ease the exposition) let W be the unique …xed point to the mapping T ( ) de…ned by (7) . Let denote the retention policy such that, for any t and any t 2 t ; conditional on the manager being employed in period t; he is retained at the end of period t
if and only if E~
The pair of policies ( ; ) solves the …rm's relaxed program.
The e¤ort and turnover policies that solve the relaxed program are thus the "virtual analogs" of the policies E and E that maximize e¢ ciency, as given in Proposition 1. Note that, in each period t; and for each history t 2 t , the optimal e¤ort t t is chosen so as to trade o¤ the e¤ect of a marginal variation in e¤ort on total surplus e t + t (e t ) (1 ) U o with its e¤ect on the managers'informational rents, as computed from period one's perspective (i.e., at the time the managers are hired). The fact that both the …rm's and the managers'preferences are additively separable over time implies that this trade-o¤ is una¤ected by the possibility that the …rm replaces the managers. Furthermore, because each type 1 's rent V ( 1 ) is increasing in the e¤ort t (
) that the …rm asks each less productive type 0 1 < 1 in each period t 1, the optimal e¤ort policy is downward distorted relative to its e¢ cient counterpart E ; as in La¤ont and Tirole's (1986) static model.
More interestingly, note that, …xing the initial type 1 , the dynamics of e¤ort in subsequent periods is entirely driven by the dynamics of the impulse response functions J t 1 : These functions, by describing the e¤ect of period-one productivity on subsequent productivity, capture how the persistence of the managers'initial private information evolves over time. Because such persistence is what makes more productive (period-one) types expect larger surplus in subsequent periods than initially less productive types, the dynamics of the impulse responses J t 1 are what determine the dynamics of e¤ort decisions t .
Next, consider the turnover policy. The characterization of the pro…t-maximizing policy parallels the one for the e¢ cient policy E in Proposition 1. The proof in the Appendix …rst establishes that the (unique) …xed point W to the mapping T ( ) given by (7) coincides with the value function associated with the problem that involves choosing the turnover policy so as to maximize the expected total virtual surplus (given for each manager by (6)) taking as given the pro…t-maximizing e¤ort policy . It then uses W to derive the optimal retention policy.
For any t; any t 2 t , W t gives the …rm's expected continuation pro…ts (under all its future hires) when the incumbent manager has worked already for t 1 periods and will continue working for at least one more period (period t). As with the e¢ cient policy, this value is computed taking into account future retention and e¤ort decisions. However, contrary to the case of e¢ ciency, the value W t in general depends on the entire history of productivities t , as opposed to only the current productivity t . The reason is twofold. First, as shown above, the pro…t-maximizing e¤ort policy typically depends on the entire history t : Second, even if e¤ort were exogenously …xed at a constant level, because productivity is serially correlated, conditioning the current retention decision on past productivity reports in addition to the current report is helpful in inducing the manager to have been truthful at the time he made those past reports.
The pro…t-maximizing turnover policy can then be determined straightforwardly from the value function W : each incumbent manager is replaced whenever the expected value E~
i of starting a relationship with a new manager of unknown productivity exceeds the expected value
of continuing the relationship with the incumbent. Once again, these values are calculated from the perspective of the time at which the incumbent is hired and take into account the optimality of future e¤ort and retention decisions.
Having characterized the policies that solve the relaxed program, we now turn to su¢ cient conditions that guarantee that such policies are indeed implemented under any optimal contract for the …rm-in other words, solve the …rm's full program (recall that (6) only incorporates local IC conditions, as implied by the envelope formula (4)).
We establish the result by showing existence of a compensation scheme x that implements the policies ( ; ) at minimal cost for the …rm. In particular, given the mechanism = ( ; x ; ); the following properties hold true: (i) after any history h t = ( t ;^ t 1 ; e t 1 ; t 1 ) such that t 1 (^ t 1 ) = 1;
each manager prefers to follow a truthful and obedient strategy in the entire continuation game that starts in period t with history h t than following any other strategy; (ii) the lowest period-1 type's expected payo¤ V ( ) from following a truthful and obedient strategy in the entire game is exactly equal to his outside option U o ; and (iii) after any history h t = ( t ;^ t 1 ; e t 1 ; t 1 ) such that t 1 (^ t 1 ) = 1; each manager's continuation payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy remains at least as high as his outside option U o : That the mechanism is optimal for the …rm then follows from the fact that the mechanism is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational, along with the results in Propositions 2 and 3.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the policies ( ; ) de…ned in Proposition 3 satisfy the following singlecrossing conditions for all t 1; all t ;^ t 2 t , all^ t 1 2 t 1 such that t 1 (^ t 1 ) = 1:
Then there exists a linear reward scheme of the form
the …rm's pro…ts implements the policies ( ; ) with probability one (i.e., except over a zero-measure set of histories).
The single-crossing conditions in the proposition say that higher reports about current productivity lead, on average, to higher chances of retention and to higher e¤ort choices both in the present as well as in subsequent periods, where the average is over future histories, weighted by the impulse responses: These conditions are trivially satis…ed when the e¤ort and retention policies are strongly monotone, i.e., when each t ( ) and t ( ) is nondecreasing in t . 40 More generally, the conditions in the propositions only require that the expected sum of marginal disutilities of e¤ort, conditional on retention and weighted by the impulse responses, changes sign only once when the manager changes his report about current productivity.
Turning to the components of the linear scheme, the coe¢ cients t are chosen so as to provide the manager with the right incentives to choose e¤ort obediently. Because neither future cash ‡ows nor future retention decisions depend on current cash ‡ows (and, as a result, on current e¤ort), it is easy to see that, when the sensitivity of the manager's compensation to the current cash ‡ows is given by t = 0 ( t ( t )), by choosing e¤ort e t = t ( t ), the manager equates the marginal disutility of e¤ort to its marginal bene…t and hence maximizes his continuation payo¤. This is irrespective of whether or not the manager has reported his productivity truthfully. Under the proposed scheme, the moral-hazard part of the problem is thus controlled entirely through the variable components t .
Given t , the …xed components S t are then chosen to control for the adverse-selection part of the problem, i.e., to induce the managers to reveal their productivity. As we show in the Appendix, when the policies and satisfy the single-crossing conditions in the proposition, then considering the two components and S together, the following property holds: In the continuation game that starts with any arbitrary history h t = ( t ;^ t 1 ; e t 1 ; t 1 ), irrespective of whether or not the manager has been truthful in the past, he …nds one-stage deviations from the truthful and obedient strategy unpro…table. Together with a certain property of continuity-at-in…nity discussed in the Appendix, this result in turn implies that no other deviations are pro…table either.
In a moment, we turn to primitive conditions that guarantee that the policies ( ; ) of Proposition 3 satisfy the single crossing conditions of Proposition 4. Before doing so, we notice that, under reasonable conditions, the linear schemes of Proposition 4 entail a nonnegative payment to the manager in every period and for any history. We conclude that neither our positive nor our normative results below depend critically on our simplifying assumption of disregarding limited liability (or cash) constraints.
Corollary 1 When (i) the lower bound v on the transitory noise shocks is not too small (i.e., not too large in absolute value), (ii) the level of the outside option U o is not too small, and (iii) the discount factor is not too high, the linear schemes of Proposition 4 can be chosen so as to entail a nonnegative payment to the manager in every period and for any history. Under these additional assumptions, the corresponding mechanism = ( ; x ; ) remains optimal also in settings where the managers are protected by limited liability.
We now turn to primitive conditions that guarantee that the policies ( ; ) that solve the relaxed program satisfy the conditions of Proposition 4 and hence are sustained under any optimal mechanism.
Proposition 5 A su¢ cient condition for the policies ( ; ) of Proposition 3 to satisfy the singlecrossing conditions of Proposition 4 (and hence to be part of an optimal mechanism) is that, for each t, the function ( )J t 1 ( ) is nonincreasing on t . 41 When this is the case, the optimal retention policy takes the form of a cut-o¤ rule: There exists a sequence of nonincreasing threshold functions
t=1 , t : t 1 ! R; all t 1; 42 such that, conditional on being employed in period t; the manager is retained at the end of period t if and only if t t t 1 . Furthermore, under the above conditions, in each period t 1, the optimal e¤ ort policy t ( ) is nondecreasing in the reported productivities.
Note that the monotonicity condition in the proposition guarantees that each t ( t ) is nondecreasing, which is used to guarantee implementability in linear schemes. It also guarantees that the ‡ow virtual surplus
that the …rm expects from each incumbent during the t-th period of employment is nondecreasing in the history of productivities t . Together with the condition of "…rst-order stochastic dominance in types" (which implies that impulse responses are non-negative), this property in turn implies that the value W ( t ) of continuing the relationship after t periods is nondecreasing. In this case, the turnover policy that maximizes the …rm's virtual surplus is also nondecreasing and takes the form of a simple cut-o¤ rule, with cut-o¤ functions ( t ( )) 1 t=1 satisfying the properties in the proposition. We are now ready to establish our key positive result. We start with the following de…nition.
De…nition 1
The kernels F satisfy the property of "declining impulse responses" if, for any
As anticipated in the Introduction, this property captures the idea that the e¤ect of a manager's initial productivity on his future productivity declines with the length of the employment relationship, a property that seems reasonable for many cases of interest. This property is satis…ed, for example, by an autonomous AR(1) process t = t 1 + " t with coe¢ cient of linear dependence smaller than one.
We then have the following result.
Proposition 6 Suppose that, for each t, the function ( )J t 1 ( ) is nonincreasing on t . Suppose in addition that the kernels F satisfy the property of declining impulse responses. Take an arbitrary period t 1 and any t 2 t such that t 1 t 1 = 1: If t is such that t s for some s < t, then t t = 1.
In words, when separation occurs, it must necessarily be the case that the manager's productivity is at its historical lowest. Along with the result in Proposition 5 that the threshold functions t ( ) are nonincreasing, this result implies that the productivity level that the …rm requires for retention declines with the length of the employment relationship. 43 The reason why the retention policy becomes gradually more permissive over time is the one anticipated in the Introduction. Suppose that the e¤ect of the initial productivity on future productivity declines over time and consider a manager whose initial type is 1 . A commitment to replace this manager in the distant future is less e¤ective in reducing the informational rent that the …rm must leave to each more productive type 0 1 > 1 than a commitment to replace him in the near future (for given productivity at the time of dismissal). Formally, for any given productivity 2 , the net ‡ow payo¤ that the …rm expects (ex-ante) from retaining the incumbent in period t, as captured by (11), increases with the length of the employment relationship, implying that the value function W increases as well.
Remark 1 Note that, while the result in Proposition 6 is reinforced by the fact that, under the optimal contract, e¤ ort increases over time, it is not driven by this property. The same result would hold if the level of e¤ ort that the …rm asks of the manager were exogenously …xed at some constant levelê:
The result that the optimal turnover policy becomes more permissive over time, together with the result that the productivity level t ( t 1 ) required for retention decreases with the productivity experienced in past periods, may help explain the practice of rewarding managers that are highly productive at the early stages (and hence, on average, generate higher pro…ts) by o¤ering them job stability once their tenure in the …rm becomes long enough. Thus, what in the eyes of an external observer may look like "entrenchment" can actually be the result of a pro…t-maximizing contract in a world where managerial productivity is expected to change over time and to be the managers' private information. Importantly, note that this property holds independently of the level of the managers' outside option U o : We thus expect such a property to hold irrespective of whether one looks at a given …rm or at the entire market equilibrium.
It is, however, important to recognize that, while the property that retention decisions become more permissive over time holds when conditioning on productivity (equivalently, on match quality), it need not hold when averaging across the entire pool of productivities of retained managers. Indeed, while the probability of retention for a given productivity level necessarily increases with tenure, the unconditional probability of retention need not be monotonic in the length of the employment relationship because of composition e¤ects that can push in the opposite direction. It is thus essential for the econometrician testing for our positive prediction to collect data that either directly, or indirectly, permit him to condition on managerial productivity.
On the (in)e¢ ciency of pro…t-maximizing retention decisions
We now turn to the normative implications of the result that pro…t-maximizing retention policies become more permissive with time. We start by establishing that the …rst-best e¤ort and turnover policies of Proposition 1 remain implementable also when productivity and e¤ort choices are the managers'private information.
Proposition 7
Assume that both productivity and e¤ ort choices are the managers'private information. There exists a linear compensation scheme of the type described in Proposition 4 that implements the …rst-best e¤ ort and turnover policies of Proposition 1.
We can now compare the …rm's pro…t-maximizing policies with their e¢ cient counterparts. As shown in the previous section, when impulse responses decline over time and eventually vanish in the long run, e¤ort under the …rm's optimal contract gradually converges to its e¢ cient level as the length of the employment relationship grows su¢ ciently large. One might expect a similar convergence result to apply also to retention decisions. This conjecture, however, fails to take into account that the …rm's endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the payo¤ that the …rm expects from going back to the labor market and o¤ering the pro…t-maximizing contract to each new manager) is lower than the planner's endogenous separation payo¤ (that is, the surplus that the planner expects by forcing the …rm to go back to the labor market and o¤er the welfare-maximizing contract to each new manager). Taking this into account one can then show that, once the length of the employment relationship has grown su¢ ciently large, pro…t-maximizing retention decisions become excessively Before doing that, as a preliminary step towards understanding the result, we consider a simpli…ed example. 44 Example 1 Consider a …rm operating for only two periods and assume that this is commonly known.
In addition, suppose that both The relation between the pro…t-maximizing thresholds 1 and the impulse response of 2 to 1 is depicted in Figure 1 below (the e¢ cient threshold is E = 0).
The example indicates that whether the pro…t-maximizing threshold for retention is higher or lower than its e¢ cient counterpart depends crucially on the magnitude of the impulse response of 2 to 1 : When is small, the e¤ect of 1 on 2 is small, in which case the …rm can appropriate a large fraction of the surplus generated by the incumbent in the second period. As a result, the …rm optimally commits in period one to retain the incumbent for a large set of his period-one productivities. In particular, when is very small (i.e., when 1 and 2 are close to be independent) the …rm optimally commits to retain the incumbent irrespective of his period-one productivity. Such a low turnover is clearly ine¢ cient, for e¢ ciency requires that the incumbent be retained only when his expected period-2 productivity is higher than that of a newly hired manager, which is the case only when 1 E = 0:
On the other hand, when is close to 1, the threshold productivity for retention under the pro…t-maximizing policy is higher than the e¢ cient one. To see why, suppose that productivity is fully persistent, i.e. that = 1. Then, as is readily checked,
, where the virtual surplus functions V S 1 and V S 2 are given by (11) . In this example, V S 1 is strictly convex.
Noting that
i.e., the expected value of replacing the incumbent is greater than the value from keeping him when his …rst-period productivity equals the e¢ cient threshold. The same result holds for close to 1.
When productivity is highly persistent, the …rm's optimal contract may thus induce excessive …ring (equivalently, too high a level of turnover) as compared to what is e¢ cient.
As shown below, the above comparative statics have a natural analog in a dynamic setting by replacing the degree of serial correlation in the example with the length of the employment relationship. We start with the following de…nition.
De…nition 2 The kernels F satisfy the property of "vanishing impulse responses" if, for any > 0, there exists t such that, for all t > t ,
This condition simply says that the e¤ect of the managers'initial productivity on their subsequent productivity eventually vanishes after su¢ ciently long tenure, and that this occurs uniformly over all histories.
Next, we introduce an additional technical condition that plays no substantial role but permits us to state our key normative result in the cleanest possible manner.
Condition LC [Lipschitz Continuity]:
There exists a constant 2 R ++ such that, for each t 2, each 1 2 , the function ( 1 )J t 1 (( 1 ; )) is Lipschitz continuous over t 1 with Lipschitz constant ; and (b) there exists a constant 2 R ++ such that, for 2 , the function f ( j ) is Lipschitz continuous over with constant :
We then have the following result (the result in this proposition, as well as the result in Corollary 2 below, refer to the interesting case where E 2 intf g).
Proposition 8 (i) Suppose that, for each t, the function ( )J t 1 ( ) is nonincreasing on t . Suppose also that the kernels F satisfy the property of vanishing impulse responses. There exists t 2 N such t 1 2 t 1 . This in turn establishes that the pro…t-maximizing retention thresholds will eventually become strictly smaller than their e¢ cient counterparts (as stated by Part (ii)).
The proof for Proposition 8 can be understood heuristically by considering the "…ctitious problem"that involves maximizing the …rm's expected pro…ts in a setting where the …rm can observe its incumbent manager's types and e¤ort choices, but not those of its future hires. In this environment, the …rm optimally asks the incumbent to follow the e¢ cient e¤ort policy in each period, it extracts all surplus from the incumbent (i.e., the incumbent receives a payo¤ equal to his outside option), and o¤ers the contract identi…ed in Proposition 3 to each new hire. Now, consider the actual problem. After a su¢ ciently long tenure, the cuto¤s for retaining the incumbent in this problem must converge to those in the …ctitious problem. The reason is that, after a su¢ ciently long tenure, distorting e¤ort and retention decisions has almost no e¤ect on the ex-ante surplus that the …rm must leave to the incumbent. Together with the fact that the …rm's "outside option" (i.e., its expected payo¤ from hiring a new manager) is the same in the two problems, this implies that the …rm's decision on whether or not to retain the incumbent must eventually coincide in the two problems.
Next, note that the …rm's outside option in the …ctitious problem is strictly lower than the …rm's outside option in a setting where the …rm can observe all managers'types and e¤ort choices.
The reason is that, with asymmetric information, it is impossible for the …rm to implement the e¢ cient policies while extracting all surplus from the managers, whilst this is possible with symmetric information. It follows that, after a su¢ ciently long tenure, the value that the …rm assigns to retaining the incumbent relative to hiring a new manager is necessarily higher in the …ctitious problem (and therefore in the actual one) than in a setting with symmetric information: the pro…t that the …rm obtains under the incumbent's control is the same, while the payo¤ from hiring a new manager is lower. Furthermore, because the value that the …rm assigns to retaining the incumbent (relative to hiring a new manager) in a setting with symmetric information coincides with the one assigned by the planner when maximizing welfare, 45 we have that the …rm's retention policy necessarily becomes more permissive than the e¢ cient one after su¢ ciently long tenure.
The …ndings of Propositions 6 and 8 can be combined together to establish the following corollary, which contains our key normative result. (The result refers to the interesting case in which the pro…t-maximizing policy retains each manager after the …rst period with positive probability, that is, 1 < ).
Corollary 2 Suppose that, in addition to satisfying the property that, for each t, the function ( )J t 1 ( ) is nonincreasing on t , the kernels F satisfy both the properties of declining and van- 4 5 Recall that welfare under the e¢ cient contract with asymmetric information coincides with the sum of the …rm's expected pro…ts and of all the managers' outside options under the contract that the …rm would o¤er if information about all managers'e¤ort and productivities were symmetric.
ishing impulse responses. Then, relative to what is e¢ cient, the pro…t-maximizing contract either induces excessive retention (i.e., too little turnover) throughout the entire relationship, or excessive …ring at the early stages followed by excessive retention in the long run. Formally, there exist dates t; t 2 N, with 1 t t, such that (a) for any t < t, and almost any
Conclusions
We developed a tractable, yet rich, model of dynamic managerial contracting that explicitly accounts Allowing for the aforementioned possibilities permitted us to identify important properties of the employment relationship. On the positive side, we showed that pro…t-maximizing contracts require job instability early in the relationship followed by job security later on. These dynamics balance the …rm's concern for responding promptly to variations in the environment that call for a change in management with its concern for limiting the level of managerial compensation that is necessary to induce a truthful exchange of information between the management and the board. What in the eyes of an external observer may thus look like "entrenchment" driven by poor governance or lack of commitment, can actually be the result of a fully optimal contract in a world where the board's objectives are perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders. This result, however, does not mean that …rms' retention decisions are e¢ cient. We showed that the contracts that …rms o¤er to their top managers either induce excessive retention (i.e., insu¢ ciently low turnover) at all tenure levels, or excessive …ring at the early stages followed by excessive retention after long tenure.
Throughout the analysis, we maintained the assumption that the process that matches managers to …rms is exogenous. Endogenizing the matching process is an important, yet challenging, direction for future research which is likely to shed further light on the joint dynamics of compensation, performance, and retention decisions.
follows directly from inspection of the …rm's payo¤ (3), the managers'payo¤ (2) , and the de…nition of cash ‡ows (1).
Consider the retention policy. Because all managers are ex-ante identical, and because the process governing the evolution of the managers'productivities is Markov and autonomous, it is immediate that, in each period, the decision of whether or not to retain a manager must depend only on the manager's current productivity : We will denote by W E : ! R the value function associated with the problem that involves choosing the e¢ cient Markovian retention policy; given the constant e¤ort policy described above. For any 2 ; W E ( ) speci…es the maximal continuation expected welfare that can be achieved when the incumbent manager's productivity is . It is immediate that W E is the value function of the problem described above only if it is a …xed point to the mapping T E de…ned in the main text:
Now let N E B E denote the space of bounded functions from to R that are nondecreasing.
Below, we …rst establish existence and uniqueness of a functionŴ E 2 N E such that T EŴ E =Ŵ E :
Next, we verify that W E =Ŵ E :
Note that the set N E , together with the uniform metric, is a complete metric space. Because the process satis…es the property of …rst-order-stochastic dominance in past types, N E is closed under T E . Moreover, "Blackwell's su¢ cient conditions"(namely, "monotonicity"and "discounting", where the latter is guaranteed by the assumption that < 1) imply that T E is a contraction. Therefore, by the Contraction Mapping Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 3.2 of Stokey and Lucas, 1989), for any W 2 N E ,Ŵ E = lim n!1 T n E W exists, is unique, and belongs to N E . Now, we claim that the following retention policy is e¢ cient: for any t; any t 2 t , t 1 (
and t ( t ) = 0 otherwise. Note that, because the process satis…es the property of …rst-order-stochastic dominance in past types, and becauseŴ is nondecreasing, this retention policy is a cut-o¤ policy. This property, together with the fact that the " ‡ow payo¤s" + e E (e E ) (1 ) U o andŴ E are uniformly bounded on , then permit one to verify, via standard veri…cation arguments, that the constructed policy is indeed e¢ cient and that W E =Ŵ E . 46 Proof of Proposition 3. First, consider the e¤ort policy. It is easy to see that the policy that solves the relaxed program is independent of the retention policy and is such that t ( t ) is given by (8) for all t; all t 2 t : Next, consider the retention policy. We …rst prove existence of a unique …xed point W 2 B to the mapping T ( ). To this end, endow B with the uniform metric.
That B is closed under T ( ) is ensured by the restrictions on and by the de…nition of , which together imply that each function V S t : t ! R de…ned by for the incumbent manager and given the pro…t-maximizing e¤ort policy , maximizes the …rm's expected total continuation pro…ts. 47 Having established this result, it is then easy to see that any retention policy that, given the e¤ort policy ; maximizes the …rm's total pro…ts must satisfy the conditions in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the linear reward scheme x = (x t : t R ! R) 1 t=1 where
and
denotes the manager's period-(t+1) continuation payo¤ (over and above his outside option) under the truthful and obedient strategy.
Note that, because retention does not depend on cash ‡ows, it does not a¤ect the manager's incentives for e¤ort. From the law of iterated expectations, it then follows that, for any given history of reports^ t 1 such that the manager is still employed in period t 1 (i.e., t 1 (^ t 1 ) = 1) and for any period-t productivity t , the manager's continuation payo¤ at the beginning of period t when the manager plans to follow a truthful and obedient strategy from period t onwards is given by
Because u t ( t ;^ t 1 ) 0, the above scheme guarantees that, after any truthful and obedient history, the manager …nds it optimal to stay in the relationship whenever the …rm's retention policy permits him to do so. Now, take an arbitrary history of past reports^ t 1 . Suppose that, in period t, the manager's true type is t and that he reports^ t , then optimally chooses e¤ort t (^ t 1 ;^ t ) in period t, and then, starting from period t + 1 onwards, he follows a truthful and obedient strategy. One can easily verify that, under the proposed linear scheme, the manager's continuation payo¤ is then given bŷ
The single-crossing conditions in the proposition then imply that, for all t; all^ t 1 2 t 1 , all
One can easily verify that this condition in turn implies that following a truthful and obedient strategy from period t onwards gives type t a higher continuation payo¤ than lying in period t by reporting^ t , then optimally choosing e¤ort t (^ t 1 ;^ t ) in period t, and then going back to a truthful and obedient strategy from period t + 1 onwards.
Now, to establish the result in the proposition, it su¢ ces to compare the manager's continuation payo¤ at any period t, given any possible type t and any possible history of past reports^ t 1 2 t 1 under a truthful and obedient strategy from period t onwards, with the manager's expected payo¤ under any continuation strategy that satis…es the following property. In each period s t, and after any possible history of reports^ s 2 s , the e¤ort speci…ed by the strategy for period s coincides with the one prescribed by the recommendation policy s ; that is, after any sequence of reports^ s , e¤ort is given by s (^ s ); where s (^ s ) is implicitly de…ned by
Restricting attention to continuation strategies in which, at any period s t, the manager follows the recommended e¤ort policy s (^ s ) is justi…ed by: (i) the fact that the compensation paid in each period s t is independent of past cash ‡ows s 1 ; (ii) under the proposed scheme, the manager's period-s compensation, net of his disutility of e¤ort, is maximized at e s = s (^ s ); (iii) cash ‡ows have no e¤ect on retention. Together, these properties imply that, given any continuation strategy that prescribes e¤ort choices di¤erent from those implied by (15) , there exists another continuation strategy whose e¤ort choices comply with (15) for all s t; all^ s ; which gives the manager a (weakly) higher expected continuation payo¤.
Next, it is easy to see that, under any continuation strategy that satis…es the aforementioned e¤ort property, the manager's expected payo¤ in each period s t is bounded uniformly over s .
In turn, this implies that a continuity-at-in…nity condition similar to that in Fudenberg and Levine (1983) holds in this environment. Precisely, for any > 0, there exists t large enough such that, for all t 2 t , and all^ t 1 ; t 1 2 t 1 ; t û t ( t ;^ t 1 ) u t ( t ; t 1 ) < , whereû t and u t are continuation payo¤s under arbitrary continuation strategies satisfying the above e¤ort restriction, given arbitrary histories of reports^ t 1 and t 1 . This continuity-at-in…nity property, together with the aforementioned property about one-stage deviations from a truthful and obedient strategy, imply that, after any history, the manager's continuation payo¤ under a truthful and obedient strategy from that period onwards is weakly higher than the expected payo¤ under any other continuation strategy. We thus conclude that, whenever the pair of policies ( ; ) satis…es all the single-crossing conditions in the proposition, it can be implemented by the proposed linear reward scheme. That is, the mechanism = ( ; ; s ) is incentive compatible and sequentially individually rational. That the mechanism is optimal then follows from Proposition 2 by observing that, under ;
type obtains an expected payo¤ equal to his outside option, i.e., V ( ) = U o : The last claim in the proposition that the policies ( ; ) are implemented under any mechanism that is optimal for the …rm then follows from the fact that such policies are the "essentially" unique policies that solve the relaxed program, where essentially means up to a zero measure set of histories.
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from inspecting the terms S t and t of the linear scheme de…ned in the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Assume that each function h t ( ) ( )J t 1 ( ) is nondecreasing. Because the function g(e; h; ) e + (e) + h 0 (e) (1 ) U o has the strict increasing di¤erences property with respect to e and h, each function t ( ) is nondecreasing. This property follows from standard monotone comparative statics results by noting that, for each t; each that, since ( )J t 1 ( ) is nondecreasing, so is the function V S t ( ) -this is an immediate implication of the envelope theorem. This property, together with the fact that the process describing the evolution of the managers'productivities satis…es the property of …rst-order stochastic dominance in past types implies that N is closed under the operator T ( ). It follows that lim n!1 T ( ) n W is in N . The fact that T ( ) : B ! B admits a unique …xed point then implies that lim n!1 T ( ) n W = W .
The last result, together with "…rst-order stochastic dominance in types" implies that, for each t; each t 1 2 t 1 ; E~ t+1 j(
is nondecreasing in t : Given the monotonicity of each function E~ t+1 j(
, it is then immediate that the retention policy that maximizes the …rm's pro…ts must be a cut-o¤ rule with cut-o¤ functions ( t ( )) 1 t=1 satisfying the conditions in the proposition. A sequence of cut-o¤ functions ( t ( )) 1 t=1 satisfying these conditions is, for example, the following: for any t, any t 1 2 t 1 ;
The property that each t ( ) and t ( ) are nondecreasing implies that the policy and satisfy all the single-crossing conditions of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6. We prove the proposition by showing that, for any arbitrary pair of periods s; t; with s < t, and an arbitrary history of productivities t = s ;
Proof of Example 1. Note that ( 1 ) = Also, once endowed with the uniform metric, C(c 00 ; c 0 ) is a complete metric space. Hence, from the same arguments as in the proofs of the previous propositions, the unique …xed point W E;c 0 2 B E to the operator T E;c 0 must be an element of C(c 00 ; c 0 ). That is, for all 2 , W E;c 0 ( ) W E;c 00 ( ) (c 00 c 0 ). The next lemma establishes a strict ranking between the separation payo¤s under the e¢ cient and the pro…t-maximizing contracts. 
